The objective of this article is to explore the role of parliament in police governance in selected countries in Asia and Europe, including Belgium, Germany, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom. Based on a comparative framework of analysis, the country case studies demonstrate that parliaments apply their generic functions to the police, including the legislative, budget control and oversight function. Furthermore, parliaments in all case studies have a dedicated committee or subcommittee dealing with police affairs, endowed with subpoena and contempt powers to compel government and police officers to appear before committee meetings and to submit required documents. In addition, for police to be fully accountable, parliaments have legislated and set up independent oversight bodies, including independent police complaints bodies, ombudspersons and national human rights institutions as well as anticorruption/financial audit bodies and dataprotection commissioners.
Introduction
A s the primary agency for law enforcement, the police operate at close proximity to the public and exert significant influence over the security of individuals and communities through its behaviours and performance. Therefore, ensuring accountability of both the individuals and institutions of the police is a fundamental condition for good governance of the security sector in democratic societies. 1 The parliament, as the highest representative body in a democratic system, and its committees play a significant role in maintaining police accountability. This has been emphasised in international and regional conventions and codes of conduct. 2 Indeed, in many countries, parliaments apply their generic functions of lawmaking, budget control and oversight to the organisation and functioning of the police. While parliament is not the only external accountability mechanism, outside the executive and outside the police, it is one of the most important institutions for ensuring public accountability of the police.
Despite the recognition of the importance of the role of parliament in police governance, this topic has received little attention in academic studies, and only a few scholarly articles briefly explore police accountability to parliament. This article aims to contribute to filling the knowledge gap by exploring the role of parliament in police governance in Asia and Europe. The next section will provide a brief overview of the literature on the * This article draws on the empirical results of a mapping study on the role of parliament in police governance, carried out in the framework of a EUmandated project "Support role of parliaments in police governance. This is followed by the development of a comparative framework of analysis, based on the three primary generic functions of parliament (legislative, budget control, oversight), which -in the main section of this article -will be used for a comparative acrosscase analysis of a sample of eight country case studies, four each from Asia and Europe. 3 The article concludes with a brief presentation of the main lessons learned from this study.
Conceptualizing the role of parliament in police governance
Police governance involves actors across multiple layers of the democratic system, including first the police itself, as well as executive, judicial and legislative bodies and independent oversight bodies. 4 While various other actors tasked with the management or oversight of the police have received attention in the literature, only a few publications discuss parliamentary oversight and focus on its particular role regarding the police. The IPUDCAF Handbook on Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector offers practical guidelines for parliamentary oversight of the security sector, and allocates a few pages to further introduce practical instruments and tools for parliamentarians. 5 Gareth (2006) presents an overview of the parliamentary oversight committees and their roles, followed by a case study of Policy Integrity Commission and its role in police accountability in Australia. 6 Lastly, the journal Police Practice and Research published a special issue in 2013 on the subject of civilian oversight over police. While the editors of this special issue acknowledge that oversight of the police, in terms of external scrutiny and judgement, can be conducted by various institutions, including the courts, parliaments, financial auditors, and human rights organisations, most of the attention in the volume is given to civilian oversight in the sense of citizen oversight or external oversight as carried out by oversight agencies such as an ombudspersons, commission, office, authority or citizen review board. While no systematic attention was given to the role of parliament in police governance, it transpires that parliament plays an important role in legislating, supervising and evaluating these special police oversight and complaints bodies, as is the case in the United Kingdom (UK). 13 In the cases of Canada and South Africa, parliaments decide on the remit and powers of police complaints bodies through the enactment of legislation. 14 In New Zealand, the annual reports of the police oversight body are presented to parliament. 15 Therefore, it can be concluded that in many countries parliament has defined the mandate, powers, functioning and accountability of police oversight and complaints bodies.
A comparative framework of analysis
Based on the brief literature overview, parliaments fulfil three generic functions in the governance of the police, i.e. legislative function, budget control function and oversight function. While not every parliament performs these functions in the same way, the table below gives an indicative overview of these functions in relation to police governance (Table 1) , which will be addressed in the country case studies in the next section.
In most countries, parliaments have set up special committees or subcommittees to deal with police affairs and exercise the functions mentioned above. Apart from the plenary, the committee system, including staff support, is the most important institutional arrangement for parliament to perform these functions. Various types of committees that are relevant for police governance can be distinguished:
committees with a broad mandate, for example, bills, public accounts, foreign affairs, justice, and human rights; committees broadly covering the security sector, for example, security policy, and defence and security; and committees specifically covering the police. In particular, in the context of the legislative function, the UNODC publication underlines parliament's role to oversee that (inter)national human rights principles are included in national police laws as these human rights principles set limits on the action of the police in their exercise of coercive powers and also provide parameters for complaints against abuse of power by the police. Furthermore, the UNODC Handbook gives guidelines for elements to be included in the legal framework of the police including the mandate, powers, organisation and accountability of the police. In addition, the UNODC Handbook points out that effective parliamentary oversight over the police is contingent on the knowledge of parliaments not only of the police but also how they can apply their powers and tool to policing. Furthermore, members of parliament need to develop their own expertise and sources as set out in the comparative framework above -as well as the role of parliamentary committees dealing with police affairs.
The countries covered by the case studies are from different geographic regions (Western Europe, South and Southeast Asia), with different historical, legal and political backgrounds.
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Concepts and practices of police governance do exist in all countries, and in all cases, parliaments do play a role in police governance, however, these need to be carefully assessed against the backdrop of specific contexts. Table 2 gives an overview of the rather wide variety of states from Asia and Europe that are included in the sample. Some notable contextual factors are: the centralised/decentralised structure of the state and the police; the nature of the political system; the structure of parliament; and the recent history of democratisation of the state. In addition to the generic functions of parliaments concerning police governance, as well as the committee as the primary institutional arrangement in parliaments to carry out those functions, it is important to address the relationship between parliaments and other oversight institutions. As mentioned, in many countries, parliaments play an important role in legislating, supervising and evaluating other oversight bodies, including police oversight and complaints bodies, ombudspersons institutions and human rights committees.
A comparative analysis of the role of parliament in police governance
What is the role of parliaments in police governance? This section will provide a comparative analysis based on a sample of eight country case studies. The focus will be on the application of parliaments' three generic functions on police governance - 
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The budget control function
All case studies highlight the important role played by parliaments in passing the national budget, including that of the police. Two case studies mention the existence of extratreasury budgets of the police. In the United Kingdom case study, Hogg noted the different sources of funding for the police. One source is from the Home Office and the Department for Communities and local Government (or Welsh Assembly in the case of the four police services in Wales). There are also locally sourced funds from a proportion of Council Tax known as the "police precept", which is estimated to represent 14 to 20 per cent of the central funding. In addition to the sources of income of the police, the author details further sources from the PCCs from charges for the policing of commercial events (e.g. sporting and entertainment events) and from investments. In 2013/14, Hogg reported that the ratio of central to local funding is roughly 75 to 25 per cent respectively. The author raised no issues related to off treasury budget of the police, for example, charges for its own security sector and strengthening its own parliament. As a member of ASEAN, it is important that lessons from its neighbours, such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, are included, as police institutions in the region interact with each other. It is also partly historical. As a former British colony governed via India, the progress on police governance in the UK and India is an important input for Myanmar whose social institutions continue to have an imprint of its colonial past. Most of the current, though antiquated, police laws in Myanmar were crafted during colonial times. Furthermore, as part of an EU project, it is but equally important to include cases from EU member states. Finally, it was considered to be useful that the country case studies include centralised and federal state structures as well as parliamentary and presidential political systems as this might influence the role of parliament in the governance of the police.
The legislative function
All the case studies demonstrate that parliaments exercise wide latitude of legislative powers. With specific reference to the police, parliaments provide for an updated legal framework. Such updating aims to address issues relating to decentralisation and deconcentration (as in the cases of Belgium and the United Kingdom), or demilitarisation/democratisation as in the case of the Philippines, Indonesia, or nationalization of the police as is the case in the Netherlands. Current legislation governing the police go beyond the structure, qualification and promotions, ranks, retirement, etc. of the police. New laws introduce accountability mechanisms such as complaint bodies, internal affairs units, and roles of local elective officials in the governance of the police. While formally parliaments have the constitutional right to initiate and table legislation, in most cases, the executive prepares the draft law which is sent to parliament for deliberation and approval. Nevertheless, while the initiative in most cases is not coming from parliament, this latter does have the final say on the mandate, structure as well as organisational model of the police service. Table 3 gives an overview of key laws enacted by parliament in the context of police accountability.
In various case studies, authors have cited the growing interest on demilitarisation/democratisation, creation of a national police, community policing, and decentralisation as reasons for the updating of legal frameworks governing the police. This is a response to the growing public clamour to make the police service increasingly accountable, especially to the locally elected authorities, while simultaneously addressing the need for efficient and effective policing. The different studies show that, aside from addressing police organisations, parliaments are equally preoccupied with passing legal measures that strengthen police accountability mechanisms through the creation of independent police oversight bodies, mandated to receive and investigate complaints of members of public concerning the police. These independent bodies, including dedicated police oversight bodies, national ombudspersons, data protection commissioners and anticorruption bodies, are set up by parliaments in all eight countries of the sample.
is exercised by the committee system through a select/standing committee or commission that existed in all case studies.
In the case of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, parliamentary inquiries are open to the public. In fact, the case study authors of India, Netherlands, the Philippines and the United Kingdom mentioned that the inquiries are broadcasted live on television and/or recorded on video unless the committee members agree to keep inquiry meetings behind closed doors due to justified reasons. In the case of the Philippines, congressional proceedings including inquiries, as a general rule, are open to the public except when the President requests that it be held in an executive session or when the committee determines that national security necessitates that it be held in camera. The majority of the case studies affirm the power of inquiry/ investigation of parliamentary committees to compel or summon individuals to appear before or to submit documents to the committee under pain of penalty. This system is institutionalized in Belgium, Germany, the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom. The exercise of these policing commercial events and locally sourced funds ("police precept" which is a proportion of the Council Tax).
In Indonesia, despite the parliamentary power over the budget of the ministries, parliament remains weak in terms of controlling the nontax revenue usage of the police. Government Decree No. 31/2004 authorized the police to use up to 90 per cent of certain nontax revenues, such as driving license and car license registrations, driving courses, criminal record letters and arms ownership licenses to support its operation. The nontax revenues of the Indonesian police are not without its share of controversies, as the case study revealed. In 2011, the Indonesian media reported that the police received USD 71.9 million from PT Freeport Indonesia for its services in providing security for the port. In 2012, the Corruption Eradication Commission arrested a topranking police chief of traffic for corruption. It was discovered that the money was sourced from the revenues of the driving simulator. Thailand -United Kingdom National Audit Office scrutinises public spending (in cluding the police) on behalf of parliament; The police is funded by local and central government, as well as charges of policing of commercial events (e.g. sport or entertainment events).
The oversight function of parliament
All case studies show that oversight functions or the power of inquiries are inherently exercised by parliaments, albeit with variations of the mechanisms and intensities and thus with differing levels of effectiveness. Table 5 gives an overview of practices of parliamentary oversight of the police in the eight case studies. Inquiries are exercised either in the plenary or via the committees. Members of parliament could raise matters of public concern during parliamentary question hours, either in writing or orally (as in the case of the United Kingdom), when a concerned minister may respond to queries. However, the most dominant expression of the power of inquiry/oversight All case studies show the existence of different types of parliamentary committees with varying mandates. The United Kingdom has four types of committees (i.e. select committees, joint committees, general committees, and grand committees); the Philippines has three (standing committees, special committees, and joint congressional committees); Belgium has three (standing committees, special committees, and inquiry committees); and, Indonesia has commissions and special committees.
The case studies show different levels of transparency in the procedures of parliamentary committees. In the case of the Philippines, Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, parliamentary proceedings are public and open to the media. In India, committee proceedings are in-camera, or not open to the public, in "consideration of the subjects discussed" and to ensure that "members perform their duties in nonpartisan ways." In Germany, it is attempted to keep parliamentary committees free of party politics and "window dressing" for which reason committee meetings are generally not open to the public -with possible exceptions, especially for hearings with invited external experts.
In terms of staff support, availability of experts and resources for the disposal of the committee, the case studies revealed that there is a great variation between continent and countries. Some authors, in fact, highlighted the need for additional resources. In Indonesia, for example, the author notes that "support of parliamentary staff is still far from ideal requirements."
The case studies show different levels of focus in terms of police matters. Some countries have committees that are primarily and directly, but not necessarily exclusively, responsible for police matters. Most are not directly responsible for police matters, but have them as one of their mandates (i.e. in the Philippines, these are the human rights committee, Blue Ribbon committee, public finance and budget).
Among the countries studied, Thailand and Belgium have committees exclusively focusing on the police. The House of Representatives of Thailand has a committee on police; its Senate counterpart, the Committee on Justice System and Police, however, does not focus exclusively on police matters. The Belgium Parliament has a special committee dealing with the police. The Committee P (see the section on independent police oversight bodies) reports to the special committee in parliament. To enable committees to effectively exercise their oversight role, they are provided with different levels of power. In the Philippines, the Philippine Congress is clothed with the power powers to compel individuals to appear before or to submit documents to parliamentary committees, is considered necessary for the effective conduct of inquiry. In the case of Indonesia, the author highlighted that one of the source of weakness of parliamentary oversight is the lack of the inherent power of parliament to compel witnesses, especially topranking government executives, to attend or submit documents to inquiring committees. In the United Kingdom case study, the author observed that parliament rarely uses its contempt powers against those who fail to personally appear or turn over documents. Accordingly, with its transparent process, parliament relies more on adverse media, public criticism and influence against those who fail to heed the parliamentary order. Failure or refusal to attend or submit documents to the inquiring parliamentary committee is believed to bring severe reputational damage to the concerned parties.
The role of parliamentary committees
Parliamentary committees are the core actors for parliaments' oversight role of public administrations. Members of parliament specialised in a policy, often with a relevant professional background, meet in specialised parliamentary committees. As shown in the case studies, parliamentary committees vary in types (standing committees, special committees, ad hoc commissions, and commissions of inquiry), size of membership, and rules on membership and leadership (majority and minority representation). Table 6 gives an overview of key parliamentary committees with police affairs in the eight case studies. e.For police to be more effectively accountable, parliaments legislated and set up independent oversight bodies, inclu ding independent police complaints bodies, ombudsper sons and national human rights institutions as well as anti corruption/financial audit bodies and dataprotection commissioners.
The findings of the case studies can be taken into account when considering options for improving the accountability of the police to parliament. However, it must be emphasized that these good practices always need to be adapted to the exigencies of the local context.
to subpoena persons to appear before the committees and/or to subpoena documents (subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum). It also has contempt powers against those who disobey the orders of Congress and/or its congressional committees. It can detain those who violate its orders or rules.
Such subpoena and contempt powers are also available in inquiry committees of Belgium, or to the select committees of the United Kingdom, Thailand and Indonesia have the power to invite but have no power of contempt or have never used said power, as the police in these countries is directly under the head of state, the President/Prime Minister. Such organisational setup, and the absence of contempt power limit the oversight power of parliament.
The size of the committee varies, as the case studies revealed. It is often dependent on the size of the parliament or of a specific chamber. Regarding the composition of the committees, most case studies have shown that there are systems of proportional representation of majority and minority parties. In fact, in some parliaments, the committee is headed by a member of parliament from the opposition, as in the cases of the United Kingdom, India, and the Netherlands. As a matter of convention, the chair of the Public Accountability Committee (PAC) in the UK Parliament is from the opposition party.
Conclusions
The case studies show that the governance and structure of the police is a complex matter, with a great variety of governance models between states, due to contextual matters including the legal framework, political system and other factors discussed in the introduction. Nevertheless, invariably in all states the executive, parliament, judiciary and independent oversight bodies play a role in police governance. In all case study countries, the police is accountable to the law rather than to the government of the day. This is achieved by enacting a comprehensive legal and institutional framework for the governance of the police in compliance with the constitution and international human rights law. The legal and institutional framework includes the definition of the police's mandate, powers, competences, structure, functioning, independent complaints mechanism as well as the setting up of a system of checks and balances that limits and details the tasking and reporting of the police. The parliament plays an important role in the system of checks and balances and, in particular, parliament fulfils three generic functions that are applied to police governance. These generic functions are legislation, budget control and oversight.
To improve the accountability of the police to parliament, the following seven lessons drawn from the case studies can be useful:
a. Parliament involves the public in adopting and amending the legal framework of the police.
b. For parliament to be successful in its inquiries, it must be granted subpoena and contempt powers to compel wit nesses to appear or submit documents needed to shed light onto the subject of inquiry.
